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Abstract 
 
Information security is a growing concern for organizations. Data and 
Information stored in companies’ databases are often considered as one of their 
most valuable assets; and as a result, ensuring their security is of significant 
importance. Changes to the IT landscape including remote access for 
employees, virtualisation, cloud provisioning, mobile devices and the growing 
interest in Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) are bringing new challenges. 
Despite huge investments in database security the global statistics for data 
security indicate that breaches have been on the increase. Also of concern is the 
fact that when these leaks occur, it can take system administrators weeks and in 
many cases months before they are aware that a security breach has happened. 
In this time the damage inflicted by its perpetrators may have reached sizable 
proportions. Mechanisms such as authentication, privilege management, views, 
firewalls, intrusion detection tools auditing and logging have become standard 
database security tools. However, as Maheswari, Sankaranarayanan, (2007) 
state as the methods of attack increase in number and sophistication, interest in 
more aggressive forms of defence to supplement existing methods needs to be 
developed.  This paper discusses the use of Honeytokens in database security 
specifically in addressing the insider threat. A Honeytoken is a digital or 
information system resource whose value lies in the unauthorized use of that 
resource. The key to a Honeytoken is that it is enticing, something a hacker 
views as valuable. It is then integrated into the system and no one should 
interact with it. Any interaction with a Honeytoken most likely represents 
unauthorized or malicious activity. 
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Database Security 
 
Database security is designed to prevent external and internal threats to the 
system. Three key components of security being confidentiality, availability 
and integrity. Mechanisms such as authentication, privilege management, 
views, firewalls, intrusion detection tools, auditing and logging have become 
standard database security strategies. These strategies are effective against 
external threats but have limitations on insider abuse. Maheswari, 
Sankaranarayanan, (2007) cite that as the methods of attack increase in number 
and sophistication, interest in more aggressive forms of defence to supplement 
existing methods needs to be developed.   
Kolodgy (2009) categorises two sources of threat to data, namely external and 
internal threats. External threats are widely recognised and security solutions 
are developed with this type of threat in mind. External threats originate from 
sources outside the organization; Verizon (2009) provide a number of 
examples of these external threats that include hackers using tools like Port 
scanners, Vulnerability scanners, Rootkits, and Sniffers, organized crime 
groups, concerted attacks by “black hats” with the backing of organized crime 
or national governments, physical theft of hardware or software containing 
sensitive company information, careless disposal of used computer equipment 
or data storage media. 
The greatest potential threat to databases comes from internal threats, insiders 
with legitimate access to the system. Although internal data breach threats are 
fewer in number, they have more damaging effects on the companies affected. 
The internal threat is harder to trace. These users have already bypassed the 
firewall, authorisation and have been given privileges to access areas of the 
database. Research conducted by Orthus discussed in Computerworld UK 
(2007) suggests that most insiders are trusted to a certain degree and some IT 
administrators in particular, have high levels of access and privilege. Until the 
insider threat is addressed no real security can be achieved.  A database system 
consists of different users using applications that read or update the database. 
Each user is authorised to use a certain set of applications and access to a 
particular set of data. The privilege management method is a key existing 
security mechanism limiting users and applications to particular functions and 
data, based on task analysis. In general a graphical interface will be used for 
the database interaction to allow the user to accomplish their set tasks. The 
interface masks a set of SQL statements that perform the required transaction. 
These transactions are task depended, embedded in the application and remain 
transparent to the user. The allocated privileges are linked to these tasks 
inhibiting users from accessing other data. 
However, many users have access to sensitive data through these applications 
and as many users are customer facing they require some level of access to the 
sensitive data. Although limiting the tables and attributes is relatively simple it 
does not prevent users accessing records that are of no concern to them. 
To gain competitive advantage organisations are adopting the paradigm of 
access to data anytime, anywhere for employees and also customers. This 
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brings changes to the IT landscape including remote access for employees, 
virtualisation, cloud provisioning, mobile devices and the growing interest in 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). Each of these strategies increases security 
risk, particularly from insider attack.  Within an organisation trust of the 
employees is a key security concern. Employers often require references and 
also use vetting procedures before allowing staff to access the company’s 
resources. But with the rise in offshoring and outsourcing this is becoming 
problematical. Security is cited as one of the main concerns for CIOs when 
considering both offshoring and use of cloud services. Many of these service 
providers offer the assurances of firewalls, antivirus software, secure data 
centres - but what about their employees? Additionally, companies are having 
to allow greater access to their enterprise systems with users such as auditors, 
contractors, sub-contractors and supply chain partners many of whom exist 
outside of the organisation’s direct control.   
Identifying key sensitive data and protecting it is a common security strategy, 
however the task of having to sort through the large volume of files in larger 
organisations where data is so dispersed, disorganized, and voluminous to 
determine which data is to be considered as sensitive is too burdensome and 
resource-intensive a task for most IT departments in organisations to undertake 
[6][7][8]. A simple corporate database may have hundreds of thousands of 
records and this can be compounded by the hundreds of users who have 
legitimate access to this data and identifying a leak may be extremely difficult. 
According to the United States Department of Justice (2012) with enough 
identifying information about an individual, a criminal can take over that 
individual's identity to conduct a wide range of crimes: for example, false 
applications for loans and credit cards, fraudulent withdrawals from bank 
accounts or obtaining other goods or privileges which the criminal might be 
denied if he were to use his real name. If the criminal takes steps to ensure that 
bills for the falsely obtained credit cards, or bank statements showing the 
unauthorized withdrawals, are sent to an address other than the victim's, the 
victim may not become aware of what is happing until the criminal has already 
inflicted substantial damage on the victim's assets, credit, and reputation. 
Despite huge investments in database security the global statistics for data 
security from the Privacy Rights Clearing House (2008) indicate that the 
frequency of data breaches around the globe is continuing to increase with a 
reported 218 million records containing sensitive information including credit 
card numbers, social security numbers, bank account numbers and driving 
licence numbers were stolen in the period January 2005 to July 2008. 
Also of concern is the fact that when these leaks occur, it can take system 
administrators weeks and in many cases months before they are aware that a 
security breach has happened. A study conducted by Verizon Business (2009) 
revealed that 63% of enterprises don’t learn about data breaches until months 
after their data has already been compromised and by this time the damages 
inflicted by its perpetrators would have reached sizable proportions. The study 
also revealed that 70% of all data breaches are discovered by third parties, such 
as customers or banks, meaning that most companies have no idea that their 
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data has been compromised. Any privacy failure, or even the mere perceived 
failure to protect customer data, can result in loss of consumer trust, affect 
customer retention, cause significant damage to brand and company reputation, 
or lead to civil penalties such as prosecution under the UK Data Protection Act 
and the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. 
 
Data Leakage Prevention 
One key strategy to ensuring an organisation’s data is being kept safe is the use 
of Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) solutions. Defined by Giannoulsi (2008) 
Data Leak Detection (DLD) is the process of identifying behaviour indicating a 
breach is in process and information is leaking or has leaked from a network 
DLPs are similar to firewalls but differ only in terms of the data traffic they 
monitor; where firewalls monitor inbound traffic to the networks to ensure that 
there are no malicious entries, DLP solutions monitor outbound traffic to see if 
any sensitive information is leaving the organization in an unauthorized 
manner. Although the operational logic behind these DLP solutions are good, 
the task of having to program the DLD software through all the organisational 
data and identify only sensitive data is a huge task that not many organisations 
can justify. 
 
Honeytokens 
Spitzner (2003) states that Honey Traps have been used for a time in network 
protection by making an area of the network seem attractive to hackers inferring 
that sensitive data and key operational systems exist in a particular area. In fact, 
this is a trap for the hacker.  
A Honeytoken is based on the same idea. Spitzner’s definition --is a digital entity 
or information system resource whose value lies in the unauthorized use of that 
resource. It can be a credit card number, Excel spreadsheet, PowerPoint 
presentation, a database entry, or even a bogus login. These Honeytokens do not 
correspond to real entities but appear realistic and any interaction with them 
represents unauthorised or malicious activity thereby indicating to system 
administrators that there has been a breach of sensitive database records either 
from external or internal sources [14] 
 
The operational logic of the Honeytoken is to create realistic but fake records and 
include them with the real business application data. Since these Honeytokens are 
fake, there should be no authorized activity with them.  Detection mechanisms 
such as Intrusion Detection System (IDS) signatures and DLD are then created to 
look for and detect these tokens being accessed or used. If the tokens are used, it 
most likely represents unauthorized or malicious activity and an alert message is 
sent to system administrators [15]. Intrusion Detection Logs and System Logs can 
be used in conjunction with the Honeytoken to provide valuable information as to 
who is perpetrating the crime.  
Data collected from the logs can help the system administrator in identifying new 
methods and trends of attacks. Without this information when breaches have been 
identified often it can be difficult to determine how it occurred [16]. 
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The idea of Honeytokens is not new and has been used significantly in other areas 
to identify data leaks. For example some map-making companies insert bogus 
cities or roads into their maps to determine if competitors are selling copied 
versions of their own maps. 
The development of Honeytokens cannot be generic. Data structures as well as 
data types used for organisations vary and honey tokens need to be developed to 
mimic exactly the genuine data already used by an organisation. Attention must be 
paid to ensuring the data looks genuine is essential otherwise when accessed it will 
immediately alert the thief to its nature. Credit card numbers should contain the 
same bank codes, sort codes and card number length as the genuine card 
information. Honeytokens also need to be continually added to the system to 
ensure that they reflect current data and again appear genuine and so accessed in 
an attack. 
The Honeytokens need to be sufficient in nature to probabilistically be accessed 
during attack along with genuine data. In a system containing hundreds of 
thousands of records this is not an insignificant amount. Organisations will also 
have to develop policies to ensure that honey tokens are not included in operations 
to calculate profit and loss or in tax returns. 
Programming the intrusion detection system or data leak software to recognise 
signatures attached to the honey token data means that the parameters required to 
detect a leak can be reduced. Care should also be taken to ensure that you do not 
rely on the Honeytoken as the only flag that something is wrong. 
 
Conclusion  
The challenge now is not only to protect data from the threat of theft but also to 
detect and respond accordingly when it occurs. Organisations that discover leaks 
only after they have occurred face loss of customer trust and may result in 
customers leaving the company. Whilst there are various approaches for DLD and 
IDS, the use of Honeytokens is being adopted in many security infrastructures 
mainly because they are cost effective, simple to deploy, and highly effective 
especially in detecting internal data leak threats. Honeytokens are still a new field 
for data leak detection concepts, and while there is expected to be much more 
development in this area, institutions that hold sensitive data should seriously 
consider implementing these tokens to serve as an early intrusion detection 
mechanism.  
For Honeytokens to be of use to organisations they need to generate enough data 
to be found by an intruder in a dataset of hundreds of thousands of records, there 
needs to be a probabilistic chance the data will be found. The data must also 
appear genuine, records need to genuinely reflect the real data they are stored with 
otherwise it would become obvious to the thief that the records are there as a trap. 
In ever more complex data environments Honeytokens deployed with IDS and 
DLD can help to protect an organisation’s most valuable asset, the data. 
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